








On 28 September 1976, hearing that sterling had fallen to a new low, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, turned back from Heathrow Airport, returned to the 
Treasury, and announced that Britain was applying to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for its largest ever loan.1 Thus began the denouement of a crisis that had 
been playing for six months, ever since a botched devaluation in early March had 
taken the pound below $2 for the first time.2 In certain respects, 1976 was just another 
in the long series of sterling crises that punctuates post-war British economic history. 
With a chronic shortage of foreign currency holdings, sterling was prone to 
speculative attack, and Healey’s announcement came shortly after the Bank of 
England experienced its largest ever loss of reserves.3 Nor was there anything new 
about turning to the IMF for assistance. Britain drew from the Fund on 10 separate 
occasions between 1947 and 1976.4 But while the crisis may have started with ‘the 
familiar tolling of the sterling bells’, 1976 was different.5 When Healey turned back, 
sterling was under attack because the British government had reached the limits of its 
credit, both at home and abroad. The crisis was resolved, not by further devaluing the 
pound, as in the past, but by providing Britain’s creditors with the reassurance that, 
under the IMF’s supervision, the government would finally get its borrowing under 
control. In modern parlance, 1976 was a sovereign debt crisis. 
 The 1976 crisis was also different because, to an unprecedented degree, it 
played out in and through the British press.6 The broadsheets provided the forum for 
an academic debate that helped to bring a reluctant Cabinet to a realistic negotiating 
position with the IMF by undermining the alternative strategy of widespread import 
controls. The press also helped to usher the negotiations to a practical conclusion that 
ensured the government’s survival by providing the outlet for extensive high-level 
leaking and briefing. The IMF mission flew back to Washington in December 1976, 
having extracted far less than it had expected in return for a $3.9 billion loan and its 
‘good housekeeping seal of approval’. This owed much to the role of the British press 






While the origins of the 1976 crisis lie buried in decades of British relative economic 
underperformance, two decisions taken in the last weeks of the Heath government 
stand out. The first was an agreement to link wages to the Retail Price Index from 
November 1973. Having presided over the monetary explosion of 1972–73, Heath 
thus ‘hardwired’ inflation into the UK economy just before OPEC quadrupled the 
price of oil. The second was the decision to ‘tunnel through’ the oil shock to North Sea 
oil revenues with increased government borrowing. Financing the increased deficit 
rather than deflating enjoyed cross-party support, as well as the approval of the IMF.7 
Indeed, Edmund Dell, Secretary of State for Trade at the time, believes that by 
encouraging oil importers to finance their enlarged current account deficits with 
borrowing, the IMF provided the government with an alibi for not deflating.8 But not 
every industrial nation could count on becoming an oil exporter within six years. As 
the former Permanent Secretary to the Treasury Sir Douglas Wass explains: ‘the 
borrowing programme the Bank and Treasury … embarked upon in 1974 was strictly 
for long-term credit intended to take care of the financing needs until North Sea Oil 
revenues began to flow and the current balance of trade improved’.9 
Figure 1: Average annual sterling value in US dollars (LHS) and PSBR as a 




Sources: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin and N.H. Dimsdale, ‘British Monetary Policy 





‘Tunnelling through’ also involved borrowing dollars.10 In December 1975, Healey 
arranged to borrow a total of $2.3 billion from the Fund.11 By then, the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) estimate had risen to £11.8 billion (11 per cent of 
GDP), with a further £12.4 billion anticipated in 1976/77.12 The Fund’s Managing 
Director told the Chancellor it was now ‘essential to secure cuts in public expenditure 
which would produce substantial reductions in the PSBR over the next few years’.13 
However, the 1975 loan facilities came with low conditionality, and Healey was able 
to borrow against a vague promise to limit the PSBR to £12 billion in 1976/77.14 
Nonetheless, IMF officials had clearly signalled that further borrowing would be 
conditional upon a lower PSBR, something they confirmed five months later during 
the routine annual consultation.15 Summing up the May 1976 consultations, Wass 
concludes: ‘there could have been little doubt in the minds of UK policy makers that if 
recourse had to be made to the IMF for help later in the year the terms would involve a 
big fiscal policy change’.16 
 ‘Tunnelling through’ rather than deflating contributed to UK inflation of nearly 
25 per cent in 1975. While this exceeded the OECD average, the pound remained 
remarkably stable, propped up, in part, by the reflux of sterling from those newly 
enriched oil producers with historical ties to the UK.17 While increased sterling 
balances were welcomed as a short-term expedient, they created problems elsewhere. 
Higher UK inflation meant domestic costs outstripped global costs. British 
manufacturers needed a weaker pound if they were to produce the desired export-led 
recovery. Exchange rate policy in 1975 was therefore, opportunistically and discreetly, 
to depreciate sterling to maintain ‘constant competitiveness’, while ‘creaming off’ 
foreign currency whenever the pound was strong, i.e. selling on a rising market. As the 
IMF’s European Director explained: ‘the Chancellor has also to consider the effects of 
depreciation on the large holders of sterling. In this area, the tactics are to avoid the 
appearance of seeking a depreciation but rather to accept depreciation, after the 
expenditure of some reserves, whenever market pressures are strong.’18 If the 
international holders of sterling realized what was afoot they could, in theory, demand 
repayment in dollars at a moment’s notice. With the reserves standing at a fraction of 
the sterling balances, the Bank did not have the money to repay.19 
 In 1968, the previous Labour government had persuaded the official holders to 
keep a portion of their reserves in sterling by writing dollar-price guarantees. The need 
for continued financing after the oil shock saw the guarantees extended beyond their 
 
 4 
scheduled expiry in December 1973. This came at a cost that the Treasury was 
unwilling to bear indefinitely. And, as Samuel Brittan pointed out in the Financial 
Times, the Treasury was ‘more concerned for our competitive position than with 
allaying the nerves of foreign holders of sterling’.20 With the guarantees finally 
expiring in December 1974, the sterling balance holders had to rely on the willingness 
and ability of the British monetary authorities to maintain the value of the pound. In 
1975, they gave fair warning that they would run down their balances if sterling 
weakened.21 The fulfilment of this warning after March 1976 helped to transform a 
sterling crisis into a sovereign debt crisis. 
 
The botched devaluation 
 
On 1 March 1976, with sterling still stubbornly high, the Chancellor and the Governor 
of the Bank of England decided to force the pace, albeit they had yet to agree the 
modalities of how the pound might be lowered without dislodging the sterling 
balances.22 Two days later, Bank and Treasury officials met to discuss tactics.23 A step 
change was ruled out as too risky.24 Officials preferred the subterfuge of an ‘induced 
slide’. This might be achieved through more aggressive creaming-off, and/or by 
lowering the interest-rate differential against the dollar. The key was ‘to avoid 
exposing that the government was directly responsible’.25 
 Somewhat unexpectedly, ‘D-Day’ arrived the next day.26 On 4 March, Bank 
dealers complied with Treasury instructions ‘to resist robustly any further appreciation 
whatsoever’ by aggressively creaming off $282 million.27 As the Bank’s chief foreign 
exchange dealer explained: ‘in order to counter the Treasury’s near pathological fear 
of a narrowing effective depreciation, we came back as sellers of sterling at lower 
levels on a number of occasions’.28 This was interpreted by currency dealers as the 
Bank selling on a falling market, something it was pledged never to do. When 
sentiment turned against sterling in the afternoon, Bank dealers withdrew until the last 
hour of trading: 
 
In normal circumstances, with such a swift reversal, we should have begun to 
buy a little sterling almost immediately. Had we done so immediately however 
and been successful, those elements in the Treasury anxious for further 
depreciation could well have accused us of trying to stabilise the effective 




The next day, the Bank followed through with a planned 25 basis point reduction in 
Minimum Lending Rate. After aggressively creaming off on 4 March, this was the 
second phase of the strategy to lower the pound by narrowing the interest rate 
differential with the dollar. The market was in no doubt that there had been a change 
in tactics and took sterling below $2 for the first time. As the Financial Times pointed 
out: ‘the fall was in line with the Government’s known long-term policy of allowing 
sterling to fall to reflect the difference between inflation rates in the UK and other 
countries in order to maintain the competitive position of UK exporters’.30 Over the 
next fortnight, the Bank spent almost 20 per cent of its precious reserves stabilizing 
the rate around $1.92.31 With a continued balance of payments deficit to finance and 
the falling pound triggering the predicted withdrawals of the sterling balances, each 
dollar spent made another approach to the IMF more likely. Commenting on the 
pound’s weakness, the Daily Telegraph warned: ‘Only painful cuts in public 
expenditure will convince the world that we mean to live within our real income. 
Probably we shall have to wait until the Government is forced to seek a major loan 
from the IMF. Then there may well be stringent terms on public spending.’32 
 Ironically, as a direct result of botching the devaluation in March 1976, Britain 
was thrown one last lifeline before the increasingly likely session with the Fund. The 
Europeans were annoyed at the British for instigating the exchange rate volatility that 
saw the French franc ejected from the European monetary ‘snake’ on 15 March.33 
Britain had reneged on an agreement, signed at Rambouillet the previous November, 
that the leading central banks would cooperate to ‘counter disorderly market 
conditions or erratic fluctuations in exchange rates’.34 When sterling reached a new 
low in early June, the leading industrial nations invoked ‘the spirit of Rambouillet’ to 
assemble a $5.3 billion credit facility for Britain.35 However, the loan came with 
conditions. There was a presumption on the part of the creditors that the government 
would use the breathing space to cut the PSBR.36 If not, Healey would be forced to 
repay any amounts outstanding after six months with a high conditionality loan from 
the IMF. Fay and Young, in a series of Sunday Times articles from 1978, make great 
play of this ‘IMF take-out’ (replacement loan), suggesting that the Under-Secretary of 
the US Treasury, Ed Yeo, dispelled the euphoria that greeted the credit facility in 
London by imposing the take-out on a reluctant Prime Minister and Chancellor.37 
However, IMF take-outs were a long-standing feature of multilateral credit 
arrangements.38 The clause was no surprise to the Governor, Gordon Richardson, who 
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reassured his Federal Reserve counterpart, Arthur Burns, from the outset that any 
drawings would be ‘fully covered by our undrawn tranches at the IMF’.39 American 
officials had been telling the British for months that drawings would require an IMF 
take-out and, in case Healey had forgotten, Johannes Witteveen, Managing Director of 
the Fund, reminded him during a telephone conversation on 3 June.40 Healey’s claim 
that the $5.3 billion facility came ‘with no strings attached’ was disingenuous.41 It was 
precisely the ‘strings’ that marked the transformation from a sterling crisis into a 
sovereign debt crisis that would be resolved only by reducing the PSBR. 
 The reactions of the different financial markets to the loan facility were 
revealing. With the Bank able to call upon an additional $5.3 billion, the sterling 
market entered a period of relative calm. The gilt market went on a buyers strike. As 
The Times pointed out, all Healey had done was ‘borrow’ another six months in which 
to reduce the PSBR before cuts were imposed by the IMF.42 This he set about doing, 
extracting £1 billion of cuts after an ‘appallingly difficult’ round of Cabinet 
meetings.43 Combined with a £1 billion rise in National Insurance contributions sprung 
upon ministers at the eleventh hour, this reduced the PSBR estimate for 1977/78 to £9 
billion. Despite heavy briefing of the press before the announcement, the package was 
poorly received. There was a sense that Healey had fluffed his last opportunity to cut 
spending unilaterally and the markets resumed their slide. On 9 September, following 
the publication of a £905 million drop in the sterling balances, and with no prospect of 
repaying what had already been drawn on the loan facility, the Bank was instructed to 
‘let the rate go’.44 The next day, the Permanent Secretary informed Healey that another 
visit to the Fund was inevitable.45 
 
The battle of the PSBR 
 
There are several accounts of the often fraught negotiations that preceded the IMF’s 
$3.9 billion loan in December 1976, with Sir Douglas Wass providing the most 
detailed.46 There were three core issues: the ‘correct’ level for sterling, acceptable 
monetary targets, and an appropriate level for the PSBR in 1977/78.47 Since all 
involved in the negotiations believed that export-led growth would require a 
‘competitive’ pound and Healey had already announced a monetary target in July, the 
PSBR was the most contentious issue.48 The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, claims 
that his fallback position was always the £9 billion figure agreed by Cabinet in July.49 
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Healey’s position changed over the course of the negotiations, reflecting the split 
within the Treasury between the Home Finance Department, in favour of minimal 
cuts, and the Overseas Finance Department, more in tune with international opinion, 
which argued for cuts of up to £3 billion. The IMF’s initial negotiating position had 
emerged during preliminary discussions in July.50 Fund economists were concerned 
that a PSBR above £6.5 billion might ‘crowd out’ the private sector borrowing 
required to finance export-led growth, and this was the figure communicated to the 
Treasury.51 Arcane negotiations about the correct level of the PSBR were usually 
conducted behind closed doors and reported, if at all, in the specialized financial press. 
However, such was the sense of crisis in the autumn of 1976, with the survival of the 
government in real doubt, that a public debate erupted within the broadsheets. It is 
worth, therefore, briefly sketching the positions taken by the quality press on the 
PSBR. The Times wanted £5 billion of cuts in 1977/78, with further reductions leading 
to a Budget in ‘near balance’ by 1979/80.52 The Daily Telegraph and The Economist 
took broadly similar positions.53 The Financial Times argued for a minimum of £2 
billion, while The Guardian was closest to the final outcome with its call for just £1 
billion of cuts.54 By the time the package emerged, after several weeks of tense 
negotiations in Whitehall, most of these positions had shifted, partly as a result of a 
lively academic debate that took place within the letters page of The Times. 
 
The academic debate 
 
On 2 December The Times political columnist, Ronald Butt, wrote: 
 
The most amazing feature of the debate on the economy and the IMF loan 
which has preceded the assembly of the package on public spending and 
taxation now put by Mr Healey in front of the Cabinet is the extent to which 
the argument has been carried on, in, and (which is not quite the same thing) 
through the press.55 
 
The debate ‘in’ the press involved a theoretical battle between several of Britain’s 
leading economists. The catalyst was a Times editorial, ‘Programme for Economic 
Stability’, published on 20 September.56 As well as an immediate £5 billion cut in 
public expenditure, the newspaper called for a series of declining money supply 
targets, a ‘cleanly’ floating pound, and indirect tax rises. The Cambridge economist 
and former Treasury adviser Wynne Godley responded a week later, calling the article 
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‘a useful stimulus to the public discussion, which has so far been curiously 
impoverished’.57 Godley was a founder of the New Cambridge School, which, 
disillusioned with the practical results of devaluation, was then advocating a 1930s-
style General Tariff behind which British industry could be nursed back to health. He 
believed The Times programme to be ‘dangerously mistaken’, with politically 
unacceptable consequences for unemployment. Only ‘large scale nonselective 
industrial protection’ would solve Britain’s endemic balance of payments problem. 
This drew out the monetarists. Brian Griffiths of the London School of Economics 
(LSE) and Geoffrey Wood of City University argued, from a largely theoretical 
standpoint, that protection would simply divert resources to unproductive sectors of 
the economy and raise the exchange rate.58 This would have negative consequences 
for export volumes and unemployment. On 11 October the former IMF economist 
John Williamson joined the fray, labelling protection ‘the latest, and silliest, example 
of the tendency to search for simple answers to complex problems that has left such 
unhappy scars on British economic policy’.59 This prompted a withering response 
from the Cambridge economist (and former Treasury adviser) Lord Kaldor, for whom 
Williamson argued ‘as if Sir Roy Harrod, Lord Keynes and other distinguished 
economists of the twentieth century had never existed’.60 
 The debate centred on the merits of protection versus devaluation, particularly 
on the contribution of the 1967 devaluation to the eventual improvement in the 
current account in 1969. Godley and Kaldor believed it had contributed little. Rather, 
it was tight fiscal and monetary policy that had generated the surplus by restraining 
domestic demand. The Oxford economists John Flemming and Maurice Scott 
disagreed. Devaluation had failed because of supply-side constraints. Remove these, 
they argued, and devaluation would work.61 They were supported by another former 
Chief Economic Adviser, Sir Alec Cairncross, also by then at Oxford, who was 
convinced that devaluation would work ‘in the end’.62 
 With views sufficiently entrenched to rule out a consensus, the debate shifted 
to the PSBR. The public sector deficit might be the proximate cause of the balance of 
payments deficit, as the New Cambridge economists argued, or it may work through 
the private sector, by generating a higher private sector surplus, as the ‘international 
monetarists’ of the London Business School (LBS) believed.63 Either way, all were 
agreed that the PSBR was too high. The question was how far and how fast it should 
be reduced. In his 21 October Mansion House speech, Healey argued that cuts on the 
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scale proposed by The Times would reduce the standard of living by at least 10 per 
cent, lower output by 5 per cent, and add a million to the ranks of the unemployed.64 
The Times reaffirmed its position, prompting an intervention from another former 
Treasury adviser, Michael Posner, recently enough departed to represent the 
‘Treasury view’.65 While ‘the public must by now be a little fed up with economists’ 
theoretical posturings’, Posner nonetheless felt The Times programme merited a 
considered response.66 An immediate cut of £5 billion was ‘merely the Treasury 
doctrine of 1925’.67 It would take years rather than months for the private sector to fill 
the gap in demand. In any event, the newspaper had given little indication of where 
the axe would fall, something The Times rectified on 15 November with a detailed 
programme of cuts.68   
 By the middle of November, negotiations in Whitehall between the Treasury 
and the IMF were deadlocked. This provided the context for a detailed intervention 
from seven economists (the ‘seven’), led by Wilfred Beckerman of Balliol College, 
Oxford, who sought to chart a course between the deflationists and the 
protectionists.69 As the Financial Times pointed out, the group boasted impressive 
establishment connections and, together, comprised ‘an almost archetypal [Treasury] 
Economic Adviser’.70 Their powerful case against rapid deficit reduction and 
protection in favour of further devaluation provided ‘the warmest endorsement the 
Chancellor has received for a very long time’.71 While the ‘seven’ originally set out to 
refute the New Cambridge case for protection, they succeeded in establishing some 
common ground. All were agreed that Britain needed an export-led recovery. The 
Cambridge economists thought British industry was in such poor shape that this could 
only happen behind a tariff wall; the ‘seven’ believed that with the right supply-side 
reforms, devaluation could be made to work. Both groups agreed that to slash the 
PSBR along the lines suggested by The Times, the LBS, or the monetarists of the LSE 
and City University would be hugely and unnecessarily damaging. 
 On 25 November, having opened the two-month long debate, Godley drew it 
to a close.72 He still differed with the ‘seven’ on the merits of protection, but he hoped 
they were right that the pound had already dropped far enough to generate a balance 
of payments surplus. Summarizing the debate in The Guardian, Peter Jenkins wrote: 
 
it was in the columns of the newspapers, notably in the columns of the Times 
– under the very eye of the enemy, so to speak – that the intellectual dispute 
took place … The rallying of the neo-Keynesians (with honours especially to 
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Wilfred Beckerman, Michael Posner and Wynne Godley, in spite of the last-
named’s protectionist heresies) caused the monetarists at least to shift their 
ground. Extreme talk of reductions in the PSBR of as much as £5 billions in a 
single year (by the editor of the Times, for example) was exposed as the 
dangerous nonsense it had always been.73 
 
While Jenkins was careful to point out that there were few theoretical monetarists 
within either the Treasury or the Bank, and none within Cabinet, monetarist 
arguments had been used to justify large spending cuts. The conclusion of the 
academic debate in favour of a small reduction in the PSBR and against tariffs helped 
Callaghan and Healey to overturn an initial Cabinet majority against the deal then 
being negotiated with the IMF. On 27 November, on the eve of the crucial series of 
Cabinet meetings, the Evening Standard reported: ‘What is now discernible is a 
movement among both economists and politicians towards a common view that really 
savage cuts in public spending at this juncture would do more harm than good.’74 The 
IMF’s official historian is, naturally, more circumspect: ‘the policies of Prime 
Minister Callaghan were shaped amid the domestic political debate within the United 
Kingdom’.75 The theoretical part of that debate took place in the press, primarily in 
the letters page of The Times. The debate was also carried out ‘through’ the press. We 
therefore turn to the dark arts of leaking and briefing. 
 
Leaking and briefing 
 
The IMF was paranoid about leaks. After checking into their Mayfair hotel on 1 
November under assumed names, officials were warned by a Bank contact that their 
rooms were bugged.76 Their paranoia was justified since, despite a prohibition on 
mentioning specific targets for the pound, the Sunday Times a week earlier had 
reported that ‘The Fund thinks that sterling should be let down to about $1.50 to the £ 
(against today’s $1.64).’77 The next day, the pound suffered its biggest ever single-day 
fall outside of a formal devaluation.78 Healey was forced to issue a statement that, 
while falling short of an explicit denial, described the article as ‘irresponsible’.79 The 
Acting Managing Director of the Fund said there was ‘absolutely no basis in fact’ to a 
story which the US Treasury Secretary called ‘irresponsible and patently untrue’.80 
The journalist responsible, Malcolm Crawford, was accused in Parliament of being 
‘thoroughly unpatriotic’ and the Sunday Times reported to the Press Council.81 In the 
event, the Council ruled in favour of the newspaper on the grounds that it had taken 
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‘reasonable steps’ to check its story.82 Not only was the story true, Crawford’s source 
was impeccable − the UK’s own IMF Director, Bill Ryrie.83 Shortly afterwards, the 
IMF’s European head, Alan Whittome, informed his Managing Director that ‘all those 
nearest the calculations and almost all the economists believe that a rate at around 
$1.50 to $1.60 per £1 sterling is probably “right” at the present time’, and that ‘a 
further depreciation of the rate is unavoidable’.84 
 For the first two weeks of November, Treasury officials were prohibited from 
discussing policy changes with the IMF. They were less taciturn with British 
journalists. Just before the Malcolm Crawford story broke, Frances Cairncross wrote 
in The Guardian: ‘The Treasury and the Bank of England, tired of being told by 
people like us that they have been doing their job badly, have started to ring up and 
remonstrate sadly with critical financial journalists.’85 While officials were 
remonstrating, their ministers were briefing. On 6 November, the Financial Times 
carried the scoop that the latest Treasury forecasts had the PSBR for 1977/78 
overshooting the £9 billion figure agreed in Cabinet in July by £2 billion.86 The article 
reported the ‘growing fear’ that savage cuts in the PSBR ‘could further deflate the 
economy at the worst possible time, adding to unemployment and damaging what is a 
very weak economic recovery’.87 Whittome had conceded that if the forecasts 
‘showed both a continued high level of unemployment and a somewhat better balance 
of payments picture, he would be more sympathetic to a larger PSBR than 
otherwise’.88 A higher unemployment estimate duly helped the Treasury ‘massage’ 
the PSBR estimate up to £11 billion.89 The Fund was immediately dubious. The 
Managing Director ‘expressed a strong suspicion that the figure for £11 billion for the 
PSBR in 1977/78 was “a trick”, so that the British could make “cuts” of £2 billion and 
thus keep to their chosen figure of £9 billion’.90 Even the Prime Minister doubted the 
forecast. On 10 November the Fund’s Managing Director was told that Callaghan had 
asked ‘for an assessment of the estimates from ourselves, whom he deemed a 
trustworthy independent group’.91 Former Treasury official Andrew Britton has since 
revealed: 
 
The IMF were very keen to give us targets that we could meet. That was their 
main priority and therefore if it appeared that we were over-forecasting 
Domestic Credit Expansion (DCE) or the PSBR, that was actually helpful in a 
sense because it meant that in the event it was going to be easier to get them to 
the numbers we’d agreed. Remember, as well as agreeing the size of the cuts we 
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also had to agree what the target numbers were to be and it was very important 
to them, as it was to us, that the targets should in fact be achieved.92 
 
Two days after the PSBR leak, The Times carried a front-page story under the byline 
‘Our Economics Staff’ which, in contrast to its own editorial stance, reported: ‘the 
general feeling, with which the IMF is expected to concur, is that the Treasury’s new 
“bearish” forecasts for the level of economic activity make it less rather than more 
desirable to change the strategy to a smaller target deficit for the Budget next year’.93 
Former Treasury press officer Peter Browning calls this ‘a most curious piece’ which 
‘read like a Ministerial lecture to the IMF: perhaps that is what it was’.94 If this first 
article read like a lecture, a subsequent article (also by ‘Our Economics Staff’) was a 
rebuke: ‘it is not the function of middle-ranking IMF civil servants to treat with 
national governments on questions of policy’.95 Indeed, ‘there is no question of the 
IMF visitors making demands or laying down terms for the British drawing, although 
there has been some convergence of official Treasury and IMF opinion about the 
likely course of credit creation in Britain and the budget deficit next year’.96 
Conservative Party strategists compared this series of articles to the Kremlin’s official 
pronouncements through the pages of the Soviet newspaper Pravda.97 The briefing 
was certainly effective. While the academic debate was still raging in The Times 
letters page, ministerial briefing was changing the terms of the public debate in the 
opinion pages. The Financial Times, which had been calling for £2–£2.5 billion of 
cuts, scaled back to £1.5 billion.98 The Economist now considered that £5 billion 
might be too much.99 Even the hostile Wall Street Journal now argued that ‘the last 
thing Great Britain needs is more austerity’.100  
 The Prime Minister opened the first of the crucial Cabinet meetings to discuss 
the package by stressing the need for absolute secrecy, since ‘any leaks of views 
expressed in Cabinet could only be harmful to the country and the Government’.101 
The well-informed reporting of these Cabinet meetings in the press shows how little 
heed was paid to this warning. Indeed, there were so many leaks that Granada TV was 
able to reconstruct the Cabinet meetings in a documentary where senior ministers 
were played by journalists.102 Did all this leaking and briefing make any difference to 
the final outcome? The Guardian certainly thought so: 
 
Seldom can the visit of an IMF mission to a country in difficulties have been 
accompanied by such an intense and open public debate. There is not much 
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doubt that without the debate the Cabinet would have followed the Treasury in 
conceding to the IMF harsher terms than will now be agreed.103 
 
The Cabinet finally agreed to cut public expenditure in 1977/78 by £1 billion, which, 
combined with the sale of £500 million of the Bank’s holding in British Petroleum, 
reduced the PSBR forecast to £8.7 billion, with a further £1.5 billion of cuts in 
1978/79 conditional upon the economy growing by 3.5 per cent. As such, the final 
outcome was remarkably close to Callaghan’s opening position.104 It could in no way 
be described as a victory for the IMF, as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
recognized at the time: ‘Callaghan apparently succeeded in convincing the IMF that 
there would be dire consequences if the British Government were pushed to the wall 
and forced to accept a tough deflationary package as a condition for the loan.’105 The 
report suggested that the issues at stake were so ‘basic to the fabric of British society 
that they required the broadest debate and consensus within the full spectrum of the 
Labour Party’.106 The British press played a vital role in forging that consensus. 
Nonetheless, having shifted their own positions during the course of the negotiations, 
the newspapers reacted grudgingly to the 15 December package. The Financial Times 
felt that the measures were ‘the very least that the IMF would accept’ while the Daily 
Telegraph saw ‘no cure’ in a package described by The Times as a ‘hotch-potch of 
wild guesses and pious hopes’.107 The Guardian’s reaction was the most surprising: 
 
The Government has failed. It has produced a package which satisfies no-one, 
convinces no-one and in which nobody believes – least of all the people who 
put it together. The only thing which the package has achieved is to persuade 
the IMF to agree to recommend the loan. The cynical may say that this is all it 
was ever meant to achieve. But from the grudging way in which the Fund is 
parting with its money, even the IMF would appear to regard the package as 
only just good enough.108 
 
The market’s initial reaction was to agree, with sterling, equities, and gilts all losing 
ground. And yet, within a fortnight, the pound was 15 cents off its October lows and 
the Bank was intervening to stop it rising too far above the $1.60–$1.65 range agreed 
with the Fund.109 By October 1977, the authorities had added more than $15 billion of 
reserves, lowered interest rates by 10 percentage points, and were enjoying export-led 
growth. Even the PSBR was undershooting the IMF ceiling, with an out-turn in 
1977/78 of just £5.6 billion. This led Healey to lament that if the true facts had been 






It would be absurd to claim that the 1976 crisis was resolved entirely, or even largely, 
by the UK press. After intense negotiations between the Treasury and the IMF, the 
crucial decisions were made in a series of Cabinet meetings which represent, for 
Bernard Donoughue, ‘the high point of old style Cabinet government’.111 Indeed, as 
Peter Jay points out, Callaghan was partly using the IMF as a weapon to impose 
economic discipline on his Cabinet colleagues.112 And we must not forget that the 
IMF was undergoing its own existential crisis as it sought to carve out a role for itself 
in a new world of floating exchange rates.113 But it was a close-run thing. Without the 
academic debate in the letters page of The Times concluding in favour of the 
Treasury’s position, and extensive ministerial leaking and briefing, it would have 
been even harder for Callaghan and Healey to overturn an initial Cabinet majority 
against the final package. And, as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
recognized, the consensus had to include the full spectrum of the Labour Party. With 
a Parliamentary majority of just one in December 1976, it was by no means certain 
that Healey’s December mini-Budget would pass through the floor of the House. That 
it did owed a great deal to the role played by the UK press. 
                                                 
* I am grateful to Sir Samuel Brittan, Sir Alan Budd, Frances Cairncross, Peter Jay, William 
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